In this paper, we consider an RSA modulus N = pq, where the prime factors p, q are of the same size. We present an attack on RSA when the decryption exponent d is in the form d = M d1 + d0 where M is a given positive integer and d1 and d0 are two suitably small unknown integers. In 1999, Boneh and Durfee presented an attack on RSA when d < N 0.292 . When d = M d1 + d0, our attack enables one to overcome Boneh and Durfee's bound and to factor the RSA modulus.
Introduction
The RSA cryptosystem [13] (see also [1] and [3] ) was invented in 1978 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman and is today one of the most popular cryptosystems. The main parameters in RSA are the modulus N = pq, which is the product of two large primes of the same bit-size, that is q < p < 2q, and a public exponent e such that gcd(e, φ(N )) = 1 where φ(N ) is Euler's totient function. The public exponent e is related to the private exponent d by an equation of the form ed − kφ(N ) = 1. For efficiency reasons, it might be tempting to select a small RSA private exponent d. In 1990, Wiener [14] showed that RSA is insecure if d < 1 3 N 0.25 . His attack makes use of the continued fractions method and had an important impact on the design of RSA. Wiener's bound was later subsequently improved to d < N 0.292 by Boneh and Durfee [4] . Their method is based on Coppersmith's technique [6] for finding small solutions of modular polynomial equations, which in turn is based on the LLL lattice reduction algorithm [10] . A related problem is to attack the RSA cryptosystem when an amount of bits of the private exponent d are known to the adversary. This problem was introduced by Boneh, Durfee and Frankel [5] in 1998. It is called the partial key exposure problem and is related to the study of side channel attacks such as fault attacks, timing attacks and power analysis. In most cases, the partial key exposure attacks are based on the knowledge of the most significant bits or the least significant bits of the private exponent d. Boneh, Durfee and Frankel showed that for low public exponent e and full private exponent d, that is d ≈ N ≈ 2 n , if d = M d 1 + d 0 where d 0 and M ≥ 2 n 4 are known, then all d can be computed in polynomial time. Their method makes use of Coppersmith's technique [6] . More partial key exposure attacks are presented by Blömer and May in [2] and by Ernst, Jochemsz, May and de Weger in [7] . These attacks extend the size of the public exponent e up to N .
All partial key exposure results on RSA presented so far have in common that the private exponent d is of the shape d = M d 1 + d 0 where M ≥ 2 n 4 and d 0 are known, or of the shape d = d 1 + d 0 where d 1 is known and d 0 is small. In this paper, we consider the situation with d = M d 1 + d 0 where M is known and d 1 and d 0 are unknown. We show that one can find the factorization of N if d 1 and d 0 are suitably small. Namely, suppose that
We show that if
then there is a polynomial time algorithm to factor the modulus N , which breaks the RSA cryptosystem. The starting point of the attack is the key equation ed − kφ(N ) = 1, which can be rewritten as
From the left side, we derive a polynomial f (x, y, z) = ex − N y + yz − 1 and use Coppersmith's method to solve the modular equation f (x, y, z) ≡ 0 (mod M e). When we perform the LLL algorithm in Coppersmith's method, we find three polynomials h i (x, y, z) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. Since (d 0 , k, p + q − 1) is a small solution of the equation f (x, y, z) ≡ 0 (mod M e), then, using the resultant process or the Gröbner basis computation, we can find z 0 such that z 0 = p + q − 1. Hence using p + q − 1 = z 0 and pq = N , one can find p and q. We note that Coppersmith's method applied with multivariate polynomials relies on the following heuristic assumption which is supposed to hold true for n ≥ 3 variables.
Assumption 1. The resultant computations for the polynomials h i (x, y, z) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 yield nonzero polynomials.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give some basics on lattices, lattice reduction and Coppersmith's method. In Section 3, we present our attack on RSA when the private exponent d satisfies d = M d 1 + d 0 with known M . We conclude in Section 4.
Preliminaries
In this section, we present a few basic facts about lattices, lattice basis reduction, Coppersmith's method for solving modular polynomial equations and Howgrave-Graham's theorem. Let b 1 , · · · , b ω ∈ R n be ω linearly independent vectors where ω and n are two positive integers satisfying ω ≤ n. The lattice L spanned by {b 1 , · · · , b ω } is the set of linear combinations of the vectors b 1 , · · · , b ω ∈ R n using integer coefficients, that is
We say that the set {b 1 , · · · , b ω } is a lattice basis for L, and ω is its dimension. This is denoted as dim(L) = ω. The lattice is called full rank if ω = n. When ω = n, the determinant is equal to the absolute value of the determinant of the matrix whose rows are the basis vectors b 1 , · · · , b ω , that is
A lattice has infinitely many bases with the same determinant and it is useful to find a basis of small vectors. However, finding the shortest nonzero vector in a lattice is very hard in general. In 1982, Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász [10] invented the so-called LLL algorithm to reduce a basis and to approximate a shortest lattice vector in time polynomial in the bit-length of the entries of the basis matrix and in the dimension of the lattice. In the following theorem, we state a general result on the size of the individual reduced basis vectors. A proof can be found in [11] .
Theorem 1 (LLL). Let L be a lattice of dimension ω. In polynomial time, the LLL-algorithm outputs a reduced basis {v 1 , · · · , v ω } that satisfy
In 1996, Coppersmith [6] proposed rigorous techniques to compute small roots of bivariate polynomials over the integers and univariate modular polynomials using the LLL algorithm. The methods extend heuristically to more variables. In 1997, Howgrave-Graham [8] reformulated Coppersmith's techniques and proposed the following result in terms of the Euclidean norm of the polynomial
Then f x Using Theorem 1, if
then we can find n polynomials v i (x 1 , . . . , x n ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, that share the root
We terminate this section by two useful results (see. [12] ). Let N = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p < 2q. Then the prime factors p and q satisfy the following properties
3 The Attack
In this section, we present our new attack on RSA when the private exponent is in the form d = M d 1 + d 0 with a known integer M and suitably small unknown integers d 1 and d 2 . A typical example is M = 2 m for some positive integer m. Theorem 3. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p < 2q. Let M = N β be a positive integer and e = N α a public exponent satisfying ed − kφ(N ) = 1 with Then (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ) = (d 0 , k, p + q − 1) is a root modulo M e. Define
On the other hand, using (2), we get p + q < 3
To apply Coppersmith's method [6] to find the small modular roots of the equation f (x, y, z) ≡ 0 (mod M e), we use the extended strategy of Jochemsz and May [9] . Define the set
Observe that f m (x, y, z) is in the form
where the coefficients a i1,i2,i3 do not depend on x, y nor z. This gives the following properties
From this, we deduce
For 0 ≤ k ≤ m, define the polynomials
These polynomials reduce to the following sets
Consequently, the polynomials g k,i1,i2,i3 (x, y, z) are in one of the following forms
Define the lattice L spanned by the coefficients of the vectors G k,i1,i2,i3 (x, y, z) and H k,i1,i2,i3 (x, y, z). For m = 2 and t = 1, the matrix of L is presented in Table 1 . The non-zero elements are marked with an ' '. Notice that the matrix is triangular so that the values marked with the symbol do not contribute in the calculation of the determinant. Indeed, the determinant is in the form
Using the bounds (4) In the following, we set t = τ m. For sufficiently large m, the exponents n e , n X , n Y , n Z as well as the dimension ω reduce to
Applying the LLL algorithm, we get a new basis {v 1 , . . . , v ω }. Using Theorem 1, such a bais is LLL-reduced and satisfies
According to Theorem 2, we need
Using (5), we get the inequality
Using the values (6) as well as the values (3) and taking logarithms, neglecting low order terms and after simplifying by m 4 , we get 2(α + β)(3 + 8τ ) + 2γ(1 + 4τ ) + 2(α + β + δ − 1)(2 + 4τ ) + 1 + 4τ + 6τ 2 < 2(4 + 12τ )(α + β).
Transforming this inequality, we get
The left hand side is minimized with the value τ 0 = 1 3 (1 − 2δ − 2γ). Plugging τ 0 in the former inequality, we get
From the three vectors v 1 (xX, yY, zZ), v 2 (xX, yY, zZ), and v 3 (xX, yY, zZ), we obtain three polynomials h 1 (x, y, z), h 2 (x, y, z), h 3 (x, y, z) with the common root (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ). Next, we use Assumption 1. Let g 1 (y, z) be the resultant polynomial of h 1 (x, y, z) and h 2 (x, y, z) with respect of x. Similarly, let g 2 (y, z) be the resultant polynomial of h 1 (x, y, z) and h 3 (x, y, z) with respect of x. Then, computing the resultant of g 1 (y, z) and g 2 (y, z) with respect to y, we find a polynomial g(z) with the root z 0 . Using z 0 = p + q − 1 and pq = N , the factorization of N follows. This terminates the proof.
In Table 2 , we present some values of δ and δ +β.
Notice that in all the presented cases, we have δ + β > 0.292. This shows that Wiener's attack [14] as well as Boneh and Durfee's method [4] will not give the factorization of the RSA modulus in these situations. To test the validity of Assumption 1, we performed several experiments with various parameters α, β and γ. We implemented the new attack on an Intel Core 2 Duo running Maple 17. All the experiments gave the factorization of the RSA modulus N .
Using the trivariate polynomial f (x, y, z) = ex − N y + yz − 1, we constructed a set of polynomials with the same root (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ) and at most ω monomials. Using this set of polynomials, we constructed a basis of a lattice L and applied the LLL ALgorithm to find a set of trivariate polynomials h i (x, y, z) for 1 ≤ i ≤ ω. The shortest three polynomials h 1 (x, y, z), h 2 (x, y, z), h 3 (x, y, z) are such that they satisfy Theorem 1. Then, we forced them to verify Howgrave-Graham's Theorem 2, that is we set
This implies that the small root (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ) of h 1 (x, y, z), h 2 (x, y, z) and h 3 (x, y, z) hold over the integers. Then, we take the resultants with respect to x, and then another resultant with respect to y, which gives an univariate polynomial leading to the solution z 0 = p + q − 1. Using the RSA modulus N = pq, it is easy to find p and q and then factor N . We note that all the experiments were successful and that Asssumption 1 was verified in all cases. We note also, that in the most of the cases, the size of the private exponent d was such that d > N 0.292 which implies that the classical method of Boneh and Durfee will not give a solution in this situation.
Conclusion
In this paper, we consider an RSA instance N = pq with a private exponent d of the form d = M d 1 + d 0 . Unlike the partial key exposure attacks where M and d 0 are known, we suppose that M is the only known parameter. We show that when d 1 and d 0 are suitably small, then one can find the factorization of N . The method is based on transforming the key equation ed − kφ(N ) = 1 into the modular equation f (x, y, z) = ex − N y + yz − 1 ≡ 0 (mod M e) where (x 0 , y 0 , z 0 ) = (d 0 , k, p + q − 1) is a small solution. Using Coppersmith's technique and the LLL algorithm, we can easily find z 0 = p + q − 1, which leads to the factorization of N . We note that the classical attacks on RSA gives the factorization of N when d < N 0.292 as it is the case with the attack of Boneh and Durfee. Our method enables us to find the private exponent d even when d > N 0.292 depending on the possibility that d has the form d = M d 1 + d 0 for a suitable known integer M and suitable unknown parameters d 1 and d 0 . The encryption and decryption in RSA require taking heavy exponential multiplications modulus the large integer N and many ways have been considered using special private exponent d. Once again, our results show that one should be more careful when using RSA with special private exponents.
